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graph LR
NIST[NIST Cybersecurity<br/>Framework]
NIST --> ID[Identify<br/>Asset Management<br/>Risk Assessment]
NIST --> PR[Protect<br/>Access Control<br/>Data Security]
NIST --> DE[Detect<br/>Anomalies<br/>Continuous Monitoring]
NIST --> RS[Respond<br/>Incident Response<br/>Analysis]
NIST --> RC[Recover<br/>Recovery Planning<br/>Lessons Learned]
ID --> PR
PR --> DE
DE --> RS
RS --> RC
RC -.Continuous Improvement.-> ID
style NIST fill:#2C3E50,stroke:#16A085,color:#fff,stroke-width:3px
style ID fill:#16A085,stroke:#2C3E50,color:#fff
style PR fill:#16A085,stroke:#2C3E50,color:#fff
style DE fill:#E67E22,stroke:#2C3E50,color:#fff
style RS fill:#E67E22,stroke:#2C3E50,color:#fff
style RC fill:#16A085,stroke:#2C3E50,color:#fff
1362 IoT Security Frameworks and Standards
1362.1 Learning Objectives
By the end of this chapter, you should be able to:
- Recognize common IoT security frameworks (NIST, OWASP, ETSI)
- Understand OWASP IoT Top 10 vulnerabilities
- Select appropriate standards for specific IoT use cases
- Apply industry security certification requirements
- Navigate compliance landscapes (GDPR, CCPA, PSTI)
1362.2 Standards and Certification Reference
Understanding relevant standards helps you build compliant, secure IoT systems and accelerates certification processes.
1362.2.1 Security Standards for IoT
| Standard | Organization | Scope | Key Requirements | Certification Body | Year |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEC 62443 | IEC | Industrial IoT & Control Systems | Defense in depth, zones, security levels 1-4 | IEC, ISA | 2007-2018 |
| NIST 8259 | NIST | Consumer IoT Devices | Baseline security capabilities, secure updates | NIST | 2020 |
| ETSI EN 303 645 | ETSI | Consumer IoT | No default passwords, secure boot, data protection | ETSI | 2020 |
| ISO/IEC 27001 | ISO | Information Security Management | ISMS framework, risk management | ISO | 2013 |
| UL 2900 | UL | Software Cybersecurity | Vulnerability testing, penetration testing | Underwriters Labs | 2017 |
| FIPS 140-2/3 | NIST | Cryptographic Modules | Hardware/software crypto validation | NIST | 2001/2019 |
| Common Criteria | ISO 15408 | IT Security | Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL1-7) | Multiple | 1999 |
1362.2.2 Privacy and Data Protection Standards
| Standard | Region | Scope | Key Requirements | Enforcement |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GDPR | EU | Personal Data | Consent, right to erasure, data minimization | €20M or 4% revenue |
| CCPA | California | Consumer Privacy | Opt-out, data access rights | $7,500 per violation |
| UK GDPR | UK | Personal Data | Similar to EU GDPR post-Brexit | £17.5M or 4% revenue |
| PIPEDA | Canada | Personal Info | Consent, purpose limitation | CAD $100,000 |
| LGPD | Brazil | Personal Data | Data protection principles | 2% revenue up to R$50M |
1362.2.3 IoT-Specific Certifications
| Certification | Organization | Focus | Validity | Cost Range |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ioXt Alliance | Industry Consortium | Smart home, mobile, network security | Ongoing compliance | $5K-25K |
| Matter | CSA (Connectivity Standards Alliance) | Smart home interoperability + security | Product lifecycle | $7K-50K |
| PSA Certified | Arm | IoT device security (Level 1-3) | 3 years | $10K-100K |
| CTIA Cybersecurity | CTIA | Mobile/cellular IoT devices | Annual | $15K-40K |
1362.2.4 Wireless Communication Standards
| Standard | Technology | Frequency | Security Features | Use Case |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEEE 802.11i | Wi-Fi Security (WPA2/WPA3) | 2.4/5/6 GHz | AES encryption, 4-way handshake | Wi-Fi IoT devices |
| Bluetooth SIG | Bluetooth/BLE 5.x | 2.4 GHz | AES-128 CCM, LE Secure Connections | Wearables, sensors |
| IEEE 802.15.4 | Zigbee, Thread, 6LoWPAN | 2.4 GHz | AES-128 encryption | Home automation |
| LoRaWAN 1.0.4 | LPWAN | Sub-GHz ISM | AES-128 encryption, session keys | Long-range sensors |
1362.2.5 Compliance Requirements by Region
| Region | Safety | Privacy | Radio/Wireless | Environment | Product Security |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU | CE Mark | GDPR | RED (Radio Equipment Directive) | RoHS, WEEE | Cyber Resilience Act (2024+) |
| US | FCC | CCPA (CA), state laws | FCC Part 15 | EPA | IoT Cybersecurity Act (federal) |
| UK | UKCA | UK GDPR | UK Radio Equipment Regulations | UK WEEE | PSTI Bill (2024) |
| China | CCC | PIPL | SRRC (Radio) | China RoHS | MLPS 2.0 |
| Australia | RCM | Privacy Act | ACMA | WEEE | ACSC guidelines |
1362.2.6 Industry-Specific Standards
| Industry | Standard | Focus | Key Requirements |
|---|---|---|---|
| Healthcare | HIPAA (US), MDR (EU) | Medical device security, patient data | Encryption, audit logs, access controls |
| Automotive | ISO/SAE 21434, UN R155 | Vehicle cybersecurity | Threat analysis, security updates, incident response |
| Industrial | IEC 62443, NERC CIP | Critical infrastructure | Network segmentation, access control, monitoring |
| Financial | PCI DSS, SOC 2 | Payment systems | Encryption, secure transmission, compliance audits |
| Smart Home | Matter, ioXt | Consumer devices | Secure pairing, local control, privacy |
1362.2.7 Security Testing Standards
| Standard | Type | Description | Typical Duration |
|---|---|---|---|
| OWASP IoT Top 10 | Vulnerability Framework | Common IoT security weaknesses | Ongoing reference |
| OWASP ASVS | Application Security | Verification requirements L1-L3 | 2-8 weeks testing |
| NIST SP 800-53 | Security Controls | Federal information systems | 3-12 months |
| ISO 27002 | Security Controls | Information security guidelines | 6-18 months |
| GSMA IoT Security | Mobile IoT | Cellular device security | 4-12 weeks |
1362.2.8 Quick Decision Guide: Which Standards Apply to Your Product?
Step 1: Identify Device Category - Consumer IoT (smart home) → ETSI EN 303 645, Matter, ioXt - Industrial IoT (factory) → IEC 62443, ISO 27001 - Medical IoT (healthcare) → HIPAA, MDR, IEC 62304 - Automotive IoT (connected car) → ISO/SAE 21434, UN R155 - Critical Infrastructure → NERC CIP, IEC 62443
Step 2: Determine Target Markets - EU → CE Mark, GDPR, RED, Cyber Resilience Act (2024+) - US → FCC, CCPA, IoT Cybersecurity Act - China → CCC, SRRC, PIPL, MLPS 2.0 - Global → ISO 27001, UL 2900, Common Criteria
Step 3: Choose Wireless Technology - Wi-Fi → IEEE 802.11i (WPA3) - Bluetooth → Bluetooth SIG Security - Cellular → GSMA IoT Security - LPWAN → LoRaWAN Security
Step 4: Privacy Requirements - Personal data collected? → GDPR, CCPA, PIPEDA - Children’s data? → COPPA (US), Age-Appropriate Design Code (UK) - Health data? → HIPAA (US), MDR (EU)
1362.2.9 References and Resources
1362.3 IoT Security Frameworks and Standards
1362.3.1 OWASP IoT Top 10 (2018)
| Rank | Vulnerability | Example |
|---|---|---|
| I1 | Weak, Guessable Passwords | Default admin/admin |
| I2 | Insecure Network Services | Open Telnet port 23 |
| I3 | Insecure Ecosystem Interfaces | Unprotected REST API |
| I4 | Lack of Secure Update Mechanism | No firmware signature verification |
| I5 | Use of Insecure Components | OpenSSL Heartbleed |
| I6 | Insufficient Privacy Protection | Excessive data collection |
| I7 | Insecure Data Transfer/Storage | Unencrypted Wi-Fi, plaintext DB |
| I8 | Lack of Device Management | Can’t remotely disable compromised device |
| I9 | Insecure Default Settings | All features enabled by default |
| I10 | Lack of Physical Hardening | Exposed JTAG debug port |
Quick fixes: 1. I1: Enforce strong password policy, no defaults 2. I2: Disable unnecessary services, use firewalls 3. I3: Implement API authentication (OAuth 2.0, JWT) 4. I4: Sign firmware with digital signatures 5. I5: Keep libraries updated, use dependency scanners 6. I6: Minimize data collection, anonymize PII 7. I7: Use TLS/DTLS, encrypt storage 8. I8: Implement remote management, kill switches 9. I9: Secure by default, require opt-in for features 10. I10: Disable debug ports, tamper-evident seals
1362.3.2 NIST Cybersecurity Framework
1362.3.3 IoT Security Standards
| Standard | Organization | Focus |
|---|---|---|
| ETSI EN 303 645 | ETSI (Europe) | Consumer IoT security baseline |
| IEC 62443 | IEC | Industrial automation security |
| ISO/IEC 27001 | ISO | Information security management |
| UL 2900 | Underwriters Labs | Software cybersecurity testing |
| ioXt Alliance | Industry consortium | IoT security certification |
| Matter | CSA | Smart home security & interoperability |
1362.3.4 Regulatory Requirements
| Region | Regulation | Scope |
|---|---|---|
| EU | GDPR | Data privacy, right to erasure |
| USA | IoT Cybersecurity Improvement Act | Federal device procurement |
| California | SB-327 | Reasonable security features |
| UK | PSTI Bill | Default password ban |
| China | MLPS 2.0 | Multi-level protection scheme |
1362.4 Security-by-Design Principles
The Misconception: Many IoT developers believe security can be “bolted on” after functionality is proven, treating it as a final polish step like UI refinement.
The Reality with Real Numbers: - Mirai Botnet (2016): Compromised 300,000+ devices that shipped with default passwords “admin/admin” - a trivial 5-minute fix during development that manufacturers skipped - Jeep Cherokee Recall (2015): $1.4 billion recall cost plus reputational damage because security wasn’t architected into the entertainment system from day one - the cellular modem had direct CAN bus access with no authentication - Verkada Cameras (2021): 150,000 cameras (hospitals, prisons, schools) breached because super admin credentials were stored in plaintext support systems - would cost $0 to hash passwords during initial database design
By the Numbers: - Retrofit cost multiplier: Adding security after deployment costs 10-100× more than building it in from start (IBM System Sciences Institute) - Average IoT breach cost: $4.24 million per incident (Ponemon 2021), with 206 days average time to identify breach - Mirai attack window: Devices compromised in <5 minutes after connecting to internet with default credentials - Patch deployment rate: Only 28% of IoT devices receive security patches within 90 days of vulnerability disclosure (Forescout 2022)
Why It Fails: 1. Architectural constraints: Retrofitting encryption requires CPU/memory headroom that wasn’t planned - example: cheap sensors with 32KB RAM can’t add TLS later 2. Backward compatibility: Deployed devices can’t change authentication schemes without breaking existing systems 3. Update mechanisms: You can’t add OTA updates if devices weren’t designed with secure boot and code signing 4. Cost explosion: Field technician visits for 8.5 million smart meters = $85-170 million (vs. $25.5 million to build security in)
The Right Approach: Treat security like power requirements or network connectivity - a non-negotiable architectural decision from requirements phase, not an optional feature.
1362.4.1 Principle of Least Privilege
Concept: Grant only minimum necessary permissions
// BAD: Device has admin access to entire system
// GOOD: Device can only write to its own data endpoint
// Example: Scope-limited API token
// Token allows: POST /devices/device123/data
// Token denies: POST /devices/device456/data (different device)1362.4.2 Defense in Depth
Concept: Multiple layers of security controls
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graph TB
ATT[Attacker]
ATT -->|Layer 1| L1[Physical Security<br/>Tamper Detection<br/>Secure Enclosure]
L1 -->|Layer 2| L2[Device Security<br/>Secure Boot<br/>Encrypted Storage]
L2 -->|Layer 3| L3[Network Security<br/>Firewall<br/>VPN/TLS]
L3 -->|Layer 4| L4[Application Security<br/>Authentication<br/>Authorization]
L4 -->|Layer 5| L5[Data Security<br/>Encryption at Rest<br/>Access Logging]
L5 -->|Layer 6| L6[Monitoring & Response<br/>IDS/IPS<br/>Incident Response]
L6 --> ASSET[🎯 Protected Asset]
style ATT fill:#e74c3c,stroke:#c0392b,color:#fff
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style L6 fill:#2C3E50,stroke:#16A085,color:#fff
style ASSET fill:#27ae60,stroke:#16A085,color:#fff,stroke-width:3px
1362.4.3 Secure by Default
Concept: Devices ship with secure settings
Examples: - ✅ No default passwords (force change on first use) - ✅ HTTPS/TLS enabled by default - ✅ Unnecessary services disabled - ✅ Automatic security updates enabled
// Example: Force password change on first boot
void setup() {
if (isFirstBoot()) {
Serial.println("SETUP REQUIRED");
Serial.println("Create new admin password (min 12 chars):");
String newPassword = waitForUserInput();
if (newPassword.length() < 12) {
Serial.println("ERROR: Password too short");
ESP.restart(); // Force retry
}
saveEncryptedPassword(newPassword);
}
}Core Concept: Secure defaults means devices ship in their most secure configuration out of the box, requiring users to explicitly enable risky features rather than disable insecure ones. Why It Matters: The Mirai botnet infected 300,000+ devices because manufacturers shipped them with default passwords like “admin/admin”; users rarely change defaults, so insecure defaults become permanent vulnerabilities at scale. Key Takeaway: Design IoT devices to require password creation on first boot, disable unused network services by default, enable encryption by default, and require explicit user action to enable debugging interfaces or remote access features.
1362.4.4 Fail Securely
Concept: Failures should not compromise security
// BAD: Door unlocks if error
if (checkAuthorization() == ERROR) {
unlockDoor(); // INSECURE!
}
// GOOD: Door stays locked if error
if (checkAuthorization() == AUTHORIZED) {
unlockDoor();
} else {
logFailure();
alarmTrigger();
}1362.4.5 Privacy by Design
Concept: Build privacy into system from the start
Principles: - Minimize data collection (only collect what’s necessary) - Anonymize personal data - User control and transparency - Secure data deletion
# Example: Anonymize location data
def anonymize_location(lat, lon, precision=2):
"""Reduce GPS precision to protect privacy"""
# Instead of: 37.7749295, -122.4194155 (exact)
# Return: 37.77, -122.42 (city-level)
return round(lat, precision), round(lon, precision)
# User can choose precision level:
# 0 = country, 1 = state, 2 = city, 4 = neighborhood, 6 = exact1362.5 Real-World Case Studies: Detailed Analysis
1362.6 What’s Next
Apply security frameworks to real systems:
- Design Principles - Security-by-design implementation
- Case Studies - Framework applications in real attacks
- Practice Labs - Framework-based security audits
Recommended next: Security Design Principles →