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flowchart TB
subgraph step1["STEP 1: SCANNING"]
s1_desc["Mirai scans internet for devices with ports 23/2323<br/>(Telnet - remote access) open"]
s1_found["Found: IP cameras, DVRs, routers, smart TVs"]
end
subgraph step2["STEP 2: EXPLOITATION"]
s2_desc["Tries 61 default username/password combinations"]
s2_ex1["admin / admin"]
s2_ex2["root / root"]
s2_ex3["admin / password"]
s2_ex4["manufacturer default credentials"]
end
subgraph step3["STEP 3: INFECTION"]
s3_desc["Successfully logs in to 600,000+ devices"]
s3_dl["Downloads Mirai malware"]
s3_join["Device joins botnet (owner has no idea)"]
end
subgraph step4["STEP 4: ATTACK"]
s4_cmd["Command sent to all 600,000 infected devices:<br/>'Flood target with traffic'"]
s4_action["Each device sends requests as fast as possible"]
s4_result["Result: 1.2 Tbps overwhelms target infrastructure"]
end
step1 --> step2
step2 --> step3
step3 --> step4
style step1 fill:#2C3E50,stroke:#1a252f,color:#fff
style step2 fill:#E67E22,stroke:#b35a1a,color:#fff
style step3 fill:#c0392b,stroke:#922b21,color:#fff
style step4 fill:#8e44ad,stroke:#6c3483,color:#fff
1452 Common IoT Security Mistakes
1452.1 Common IoT Security Mistakes
This chapter covers the most frequent security mistakes in IoT deployments, real-world attack case studies, and practical guidance for avoiding these pitfalls.
1452.2 Learning Objectives
By the end of this chapter, you will be able to:
- Identify the top security mistakes in IoT deployments
- Understand real-world attack scenarios and their consequences
- Apply best practices to avoid common pitfalls
- Calculate the cost-benefit of security investments
1452.3 In Plain English: Understanding IoT Security
Think of your network as a house with many rooms:
- Your laptop and phone are like the front door with a deadbolt, security camera, and alarm system
- Your IoT devices (smart lights, thermostats, cameras, sensors) are like side doors, back doors, windows, and pet doors
- The problem: Most IoT devices are like leaving a window unlocked with a sign that says “Come on in!”
Why IoT devices are security weak points:
| The Issue | Why It Matters | Real-World Example |
|---|---|---|
| Default Passwords | 80%+ of IoT devices ship with passwords like “admin/admin” or “12345” | The Mirai botnet used just 61 default password combinations to compromise 600,000+ devices |
| No Updates | Your laptop gets security updates weekly. Your smart lightbulb? Maybe once ever. | Security cameras from 2015 still running vulnerable software with known exploits |
| Always Listening | IoT devices are online 24/7, giving attackers unlimited time to probe for weaknesses | A smart TV continuously sending your viewing data to 700+ tracking companies |
| Resource Constrained | Not enough CPU/memory to run strong encryption or security monitoring | Smart sensors can’t afford the battery drain of advanced security features |
| Physical Access | Many IoT devices sit in public spaces where attackers can physically tamper with them | Smart parking meters hacked via accessible USB ports; sensors on utility poles accessed with a ladder |
The domino effect:
- Attacker compromises one smart camera with default password
- Camera is on the same network as your computer
- Attacker uses camera as a stepping stone to scan for other devices
- Finds and accesses your file server, databases, or personal devices
- Result: One $30 IoT device led to breach of entire network
The golden rule of IoT security: > “A network is only as secure as its weakest connected device. In IoT, you might have hundreds of weak devices.”
1452.4 Real-World Attack: The Mirai Botnet (2016)
What Happened:
On October 21, 2016, major websites including Twitter, Netflix, Reddit, CNN, and The New York Times went offline for millions of users across the United States and Europe. The culprit? Thousands of hacked IoT devices launching the largest distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack in history.
The Attack Timeline:
| Date | Event | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| August 2016 | Mirai malware first released | Begins scanning the internet for vulnerable IoT devices |
| September 20 | Attack on KrebsOnSecurity.com | 620 Gbps attack (largest ever at the time) using 380,000 IoT devices |
| October 21 | Attack on Dyn DNS provider | 1.2 Terabits/second - took down major websites for 11 hours |
| November 2016 | Mirai source code published | Anyone can now create IoT botnets; copycat attacks surge |
How It Worked:
The Vulnerable Devices:
- IP cameras (especially from Chinese manufacturers XiongMai Technologies)
- Digital video recorders (DVRs) for security camera systems
- Home routers with default credentials
- Smart TVs and set-top boxes
- Network-connected printers
Why It Succeeded:
- Default Passwords: Users never changed “admin/admin” factory settings
- No Security Updates: Manufacturers abandoned devices after sale
- Always-On: IoT devices stay connected 24/7 (unlike laptops that shut down)
- High Bandwidth: Many IoT devices have fast internet connections
- Scale: Billions of IoT devices = massive potential botnet army
The Aftermath:
- Economic Impact: $110 million in damages
- Legal Response: Two college students who created Mirai were arrested and sentenced
- Regulatory Changes: Led to California IoT security law (SB-327) requiring unique passwords
- Industry Wake-Up: IoT manufacturers began taking security seriously
Key Lesson: > A $20 webcam with a default password became part of a weapon that took down billion-dollar companies. IoT security isn’t optional—it’s critical infrastructure protection.
What Could Have Prevented It:
- Mandatory password changes on first setup (no default credentials)
- Automatic security updates pushed by manufacturers
- Network segmentation (IoT devices isolated from internet-facing services)
- Rate limiting on IoT devices (prevent participation in DDoS attacks)
- Manufacturer accountability for security throughout device lifetime
1452.5 7 Security Pitfalls That Lead to Breaches
1452.5.1 1. Using Default Credentials
The Mistake: > “We’ll change the passwords later during the production phase.”
Why It’s Dangerous: - Internet scanners find and compromise devices in hours, not days - 80% of IoT breaches involve default or weak credentials - Mirai botnet used just 61 default password combinations to compromise 600,000 devices
Real Example: A hospital deployed 500 Wi-Fi-enabled infusion pumps (delivers medication to patients) with default passwords. Attackers gained access and could have modified drug dosages remotely.
How to Avoid: - Mandate unique passwords on first boot (no defaults) - Use password managers for IoT device credentials - Implement certificate-based authentication (no passwords at all) - Enforce password complexity: min 16 characters, random - Change passwords immediately if device is returned/resold
1452.5.2 2. Deploying Without Network Segmentation
The Mistake: > “All devices on the same network makes management easier.”
Why It’s Dangerous: - One compromised IoT device can access all devices on the network - Allows attackers to pivot from low-value sensors to high-value databases - Violates the principle of least privilege
Real Example: Target’s 2013 breach began with HVAC vendor credentials. Attackers moved from HVAC systems to point-of-sale terminals, stealing 40 million credit cards.
1452.5.3 3. Skipping Encryption for “Internal” Networks
The Mistake: > “Our IoT devices are on a private Wi-Fi network, we don’t need encryption.”
Why It’s Dangerous: - Wi-Fi can be intercepted from outside building (parking lot, adjacent buildings) - Insider threats (disgruntled employees, contractors) - Man-in-the-middle attacks on “trusted” networks
Real Example: Smart building sensors sent temperature data unencrypted over Wi-Fi. Attacker in parking lot captured traffic, reverse-engineered protocol, injected false temperature readings causing HVAC system to malfunction.
1452.5.4 4. Neglecting Firmware Updates
The Mistake: > “The devices are working fine, we’ll update them when there’s a problem.”
Why It’s Dangerous: - 60% of IoT devices never receive a single firmware update after deployment - Known vulnerabilities are publicly listed (CVE database) - Automated exploits scan for vulnerable firmware versions
Real Example: The Verkada security camera breach (2021): Attackers exploited known vulnerability in outdated firmware to access 150,000 security cameras in hospitals, police stations, prisons, and Tesla factories.
1452.5.5 5. Ignoring Physical Security
The Mistake: > “Our sensors are just on the factory floor / light poles / outdoors. Nobody cares about them.”
Why It’s Dangerous: - Physical access = total compromise (extract keys, flash malicious firmware) - Attackers can access JTAG/UART debug ports - Sensors in public spaces can be stolen, modified, and returned
Real Example: Parking meter sensors on city streets were physically accessed via USB ports. Attackers installed keyloggers and stole credit card data from 5,000 transactions.
1452.5.6 6. Logging Sensitive Data in Plaintext
The Mistake: > “We’ll log everything for debugging. We can secure it later.”
Why It’s Dangerous: - Log files often contain passwords, API keys, session tokens - Logs are rarely encrypted or access-controlled - Logs are exfiltrated in 78% of data breaches
Real Example: Smart home hub logged Wi-Fi passwords in plaintext. Attacker gained access to hub via default password, extracted log files, obtained Wi-Fi credentials, accessed homeowner’s network.
1452.5.7 7. Trusting “Secure” Products Without Verification
The Mistake: > “The vendor says it’s secure and meets industry standards. That’s good enough.”
Why It’s Dangerous: - “Military-grade encryption” is marketing, not verification - Many IoT devices claim compliance without actual certification - Vendors abandon products after acquisition/bankruptcy
Real Example: “Secure” smart locks marketed as “unhackable” were opened in seconds using Bluetooth vulnerabilities. Vendor never performed third-party security audit despite security claims.
1452.6 The Cost of Mistakes
| Mistake | 5-Minute Fix Cost | Breach Cost | ROI of Fixing |
|---|---|---|---|
| Default passwords | $0 (config change) | $2M average | Infinite |
| No network segmentation | $15K (VLANs) | $5M average | 333x |
| No encryption | $0 (enable TLS) | $3M average | Infinite |
| No firmware updates | $10K/year | $4M average | 400x |
| No physical security | $2/device | $500K average | 250,000x |
| Insecure logging | $0 (code change) | $1M average | Infinite |
| No security verification | $20K (audit) | $6M average | 300x |
The Pattern: > Most IoT security mistakes are free or cheap to fix but catastrophically expensive when exploited.
1452.7 Common Pitfalls Summary
1. Treating IoT Devices as Trusted Network Endpoints
- Mistake: Placing IoT devices on the same network segment as critical business systems with unrestricted internal access
- Why it happens: Flat network architectures are simpler to manage
- Solution: Implement network segmentation with VLANs or micro-segmentation
2. Ignoring Firmware Update Security
- Mistake: Implementing OTA updates without signature verification
- Why it happens: Adding cryptographic verification adds complexity
- Solution: Always verify firmware signatures using asymmetric cryptography (ECDSA)
3. Assuming Physical Security Equals Cyber Security
- Mistake: Believing that devices in “secured” locations don’t need strong device-level security
- Why it happens: Physical access control creates a false sense of complete protection
- Solution: Implement defense-in-depth regardless of physical security
1452.8 IoT Device Security Checklist
Hardware Security: - [ ] Source components from trusted manufacturers with verified supply chains - [ ] Disable debug interfaces (UART, JTAG, SWD) in production firmware - [ ] Implement secure boot with cryptographic verification of firmware - [ ] Use hardware security modules (TPM, Secure Enclave) for key storage - [ ] Enable tamper detection circuits for physically accessible devices
Access Control: - [ ] Implement role-based access control (RBAC) with least privilege - [ ] Deploy OAuth 2.0 for third-party integrations (no credential sharing) - [ ] Use certificate-based authentication for device-to-device communication - [ ] Log all access attempts and privileged operations
Network Security: - [ ] Segment IoT devices into separate VLANs isolated from corporate networks - [ ] Implement firewall rules with default-deny and explicit allow-lists - [ ] Deploy intrusion detection systems (IDS) monitoring for anomalous traffic - [ ] Use TLS 1.3 for all communications (no plaintext protocols)
Physical Security (for deployed devices): - [ ] Use tamper-evident seals on device enclosures - [ ] Implement accelerometer-based tamper detection - [ ] Use security screws requiring specialized tools
1452.9 Summary
This chapter covered common IoT security mistakes:
- Default Credentials: Change passwords immediately; use certificates
- Flat Networks: Segment IoT into isolated VLANs
- Missing Encryption: Enable TLS everywhere, even “internal” networks
- Update Neglect: Automate firmware updates with signature verification
- Physical Security: Disable debug ports, add tamper detection
- Insecure Logging: Never log secrets; encrypt log storage
- Trust Without Verification: Audit vendors, verify certifications
1452.10 What’s Next
The next chapter covers Intrusion Detection systems for IoT, including signature vs. anomaly detection, deployment strategies, and practical exercises.
Continue to Intrusion Detection →