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Technical detail · NFC Security and Alternatives
Compare attack paths across interaction patterns
17.19 Folded Security Comparison Notes
Security comparisons should compare attack paths, not brand labels. Preserve these boundary rules:
| Pattern | Main risk | Control evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Public NFC tag or QR code | Copied or replaced pointer. | Approved host checks, schema validation, tamper inspection, and backend policy gate. |
| BLE handoff after tap | Pairing, reconnect, identity rotation, or permission confusion. | Device identity, session binding, permission prompt review, and disconnect behavior. |
| UWB-assisted action | Distance evidence used as standalone approval. | UWB result bound to device identity, user intent, and the action being authorized. |
| RFID inventory flow | Bulk misreads, hidden reads, and privacy exposure. | Reader placement, read-zone tests, exception handling, and privacy logging. |
| NFC credential flow | Relay, lost device, stale credential, or weak fallback. | Dynamic proof, revocation, retry limits, fallback labeling, and audit trail. |
A service tag and an access credential are different designs. A service tag can expose an asset reference that an app validates. An access credential needs issuer, verifier, freshness, revocation, replay handling, and failure telemetry. Do not let the same “tap” language hide that boundary.