Predict the Public-Key Job

Predict the Public-Key Job

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cryptography

Verify a Gateway Update With the Public Half

A gateway gets an update over Wi-Fi that an attacker controls. The maker signs the release manifest. The gateway checks the signature before it installs the image. The figures above show the key roles and the separate jobs they can do.

The release service signs the manifest digest with its protected private key. The gateway stores the matching public key and verifies before installation. Possessing that public key lets the gateway check evidence; it does not let the gateway create a valid release signature. If verification fails, the correct update state is rejected, even when the download completed without a network error.

Predict the Public-Key Job

A public-key operation only proves the kind of claim it was designed for. Use the cases below to distinguish secrecy from approval evidence.

Use the two cases below to distinguish a secret message from evidence of release approval.

  • Predict: A technician encrypts a manifest with the gateway’s public key. Does that prove the technician approved it? Check: No. Confidentiality for the gateway is not the same as a signature from an authorised release key.
  • Predict: An attacker replaces both image and unsigned hash. Will comparing those two values expose the change? Check: No. The expected hash needs authenticated public-key evidence, such as a verified signature.

Prove the Update Came From the Approved Sender

Name the signed update, public key, protected private key, verification step, version rule, and rejection path. Test an approved image, changed bytes, a wrong signer, and an older valid image.

Keep hashes, signature results, key identity, version, time, and final action. This proves one signing and verification path, not safe key storage or code quality; the deeper sections compare encryption, signing, key agreement, and trust setup.

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