Technical detail · UWB Applications and Security
STS, timing, and acceptance policy
The IEEE 802.15.4z STS is a cryptographically generated pseudo-random sequence embedded in the ranging exchange. Because the pulse pattern is derived from material shared by legitimate devices, an attacker should not be able to predict the next valid pattern and transmit a convincing early copy. The receiver timestamps energy that correlates with the expected STS, so a forged pulse that does not match should be rejected.
The timing arithmetic explains why policy cannot stop at “near.” Radio waves travel at roughly 300,000,000 m/s, so 1 ns of one-way flight time is about 0.30 m. In a two-way ranging exchange, a 20 ns extra round-trip delay corresponds to about 300,000,000 x 20 ns / 2 = 3 m of extra apparent path. Ordinary relays usually add delay, which should make a credential look farther away. The dangerous distance-reduction attack is different: it tries to make the receiver timestamp an early signal and therefore subtract distance. STS protection is meant to make that early signal unpredictable and unusable.
A concrete access policy combines this physics with application checks. Suppose the unlock zone is 1.2 m, the system records 0.83 m, and the timestamp is 180 ms old. If the credential is authorized, the side-of-door evidence matches, and confidence is high, the policy may allow the action. If an attack path or poor geometry adds enough delay to report 3.8 m, the result should be denied as too far. If a record is stale at 1.6 seconds, or if confidence falls below the acceptance threshold, the result should also be denied or sent to manual fallback even when the distance is numerically below 1.2 m.
UWB secure ranging can help resist relay-style false proximity claims when implemented correctly. It does not replace credential security, device hardening, privacy controls, or operational retesting.